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Showing posts with label Ordin Victoria. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ordin Victoria. Show all posts

Tuesday, 18 June 2013

Theatre

This Lady was only Fair
By VICTORIA ORDIN
[Special to Writers Clearinghouse News Service]
Santa Barbara, California
Let me preface this mixed review of My Fair Lady by saying I loved being at the Granada watching my (and Dad’s) favorite musical on Father’s Day and that my dinner at Maggie’s was typically sublime.  I have not felt such affection for a restaurant in all my years in Santa Barbara. For more on Maggie’s, see my On Maggie\’s and my Non-Helicopter Parents.
 
The show, however, was on several levels a disappointment, first and foremost because something was wrong with the sound and Jonathan Pryce’s singing and speech were both garbled. Gregory Jbara (Pickering) was all but unintelligible and it pains me to say this of such a great star, but his voice is gone. I mean totally gone.

Saturday, 23 March 2013

Bookshops


Good
Vibrations
By Victoria Ordin
[Writers Clearinghouse News Service]
New York
I was walking back home from Sarabeth's, my new NYC food crush, and popped in at the Crawford Doyle bookshop, 1082 Madison Avenue.

It's tiny, but as one reviewer noted, "The people who work there really love books. It kind of oozes out of their pores in an almost intangible way, and I get the sense they become friends with the regulars."


Friday, 29 June 2012

I'll Have What She's Having

Remembering Me in Nora Ephron
By Victoria Ordin
[Writers Clearinghouse News Service]
 
How to pay tribute to a cinematic trailblazer, or as The Washington Post put it in its long and loving obituaryof Nora Ephron, a rare female “tripartite”-– writer, producer, director–responsible for some of the sharpest, funniest, most beloved films of my lifetime? Literally, her professional life spans my actual one, minus one year: 1973-2012.
 
In March, 2011, while in New York, I saw Ms Ephron on Charlie Rose. A recurrent guest on Mr. Rose’s show which I love but rarely see, she was promoting her book, I Remember Nothing: And Other Reflections (2010), many excerpts of which I have enjoyed heartily though I haven’t read the book in its entirety. She told Mr. Rose the new book represented a sequel of sorts to her uproarious 2005 I Feel Bad About My Neck: And Other Reflections on Being a Woman, if a bit more serious in its reflections on mortality and the last chapter of life.
 
I have seen most of her movies except her popular and most recent– Julie and Julia – surely a terrible oversight given both my worship of Meryl Streep and what some might consider the disproportionate percentage of my life and consciousness occupied by food and restaurants. In the 2011 interview, she spoke spoke about all her most famous films including Julie and Julia, but what I remember best was her extraordinary energy, joy and comfort with herself, her life, her work and her place in the world. Some people never achieve that level of clarity and contentment, but Ms Ephron seems to have been this self-possessed even as a young woman in a male-dominated field who did not find her ideal husband, the brilliant Nicolas Pileggi, until her third attempt at the age of 46
.
I also remember a nice dig at the Kardashians, who quite repulse me on all levels and represent all that is wrong with American pop culture as their fame and net worth (100 million by some accounts) derives from precisely nothing: neither physical beauty, talent, education, charitable work, sophistication nor anything remotely resembling accomplishment of any kind beyond the hiring of skilled PR people.
Nora Ephron
 
Ms Ephron said she didn’t understand the fuss over the Kardashians, and moreover: “Why are there three of them and why am I supposed to know their names?” Reiterating what my father’s oldest friend and colleague used to say about aging – that at a certain point, your mind is crammed so full that the inclusion of each new piece of information requires the pushing out of another to make room – she added that her mind simply couldn’t accommodate the Kardashians. With her impeccable comedic timing, she took a beat and added something like: “Then again, their minds probably cannot accommodate me.”
 
Ms Ephron’s oft-quoted line about her philandering second husband, Carl Bernstein, one half of the famous Washington Post duo which exposed Watergate, exemplifies her sharp yet never mean-spirited wit: “He was capable of having sex with a Venetian blind.” Even at her most sarcastic, Ms Ephron was never unkind, no matter what challenges life dealt her. Her films are full of people who “kvetch,” or, as my father, a world-class kvetcher would say, “piss and moan.” Yet Ms Ephron herself was resolute, determined and never self-pitying, even when Mr Bernstein cheated on her with one small child at home and another on the way, in the most humiliating and hurtful manner possible. Her kvetching was always light-hearted, coming from a place of strength rather than weakness, anger, or bitterness.
 
Ephron’s account of her second marriage to talented and well-known philanderer, the 1986 Heartburn, was my first Ephron movie. Based on the book Crazy Salad, which I read some years later, the movie was not considered her best, particularly by those who had read the book first and lived through the Watergate days. But I loved it and it made a deep impression on me in the summer after 8th grade. I think the critics were too harsh and I’ve seen the film, which I once owned on a homemade VHS cassette, some two dozen times.
 
It was, during my high school and college years, the film equivalent of comfort food, for the same reasons thirtysomething was my favorite drama of the late 1980s: it gave people not in New York (or even the North Atlantic corridor) a glimpse into the lives of literate, upper middle class, professional, and largely Jewish East Coasters, where everyone seemed smart, witty, and interesting. Life among comparably situated, educated people in LA didn’t look or act like that it was the life life I intended to live when I was an adult.
 
Ms Streep, Jack Nicholson, Richard Masur, Jeff Daniels, Stockard Channing and Maureen Stapleton, Steven Hill, and Joanna Gleason formed a perfect ensemble cast in Heartburn. The Carly Simon theme song created a bittersweet tone which remained consistent throughout. Gleason plays the self-absorbed “Diana” in Rachel Samstat’s New York therapy group, which is responsible for some of the film’s funniest scenes and much mocked by Nicholson’s character, Mark, especially when the group is robbed by a thief played by Kevin Spacey in his first and small but noteworthy film performance.
 
It may be that Mr. Nicholson portrayed Mr. Bernstein in too sympathetic a light: after all, if you’re married to Jack, you can forgive a great deal, simply on the basis of sheer coolness. Mr. Bernstein was no Jack Nicholson, but apparently he too possessed great charisma and verbal talent and simply could not reform his wandering ways. And when a writer as gifted as Ms Ephron writes a book upon which a movie is based, perhaps the movie never lives up to the story told in another medium. But the film more than withstands the test of time. Given what so many actors, including Ms Streep, observe about the relative disappearance of serious or even remotely intelligent drama and romantic comedy in recent decades–at least by big studios–and the proliferation of shoot-’em-ups, lowbrow comedies and science fiction, the film looks today perhaps better than it did then.
 
I have blogged before about the film’s influence on my own views of relationship, which while not precisely Dan Savage, are more in accord with his views than not. After the movie, I had a heated discussion with one of my then best friends, Amanda, with whom I saw the film in Westwood, still slightly sandy from the beach from which we took the Sunset bus to Westwood at 14, about the relative significance of fidelity to a serious relationship. Even at 14, I was thinking seriously–if abstractly, given I went to an all-girls school and didn’t date or even socialize with boys in high school–about the psychology of relationships.
 
My view at 14 as at 40 is that there is no absolute formula or definition of marriage and that if many other essentials are in place, and both spouses are on the same page, occasional extracurricular activity is not a deal breaker. My father, very open about sex always, taught me in my teen years to distinguish between sex and love and I heeded his lesson though I was not only a virgin until the night before my flight to New York City en route to New Haven, but hardly dated even in my college years. In Heartburn, the two parties were not on the same page, nor did there exist the kind of mutual respect and attentiveness I considered then and now to be the foundation of a successful union.
 
Not long after seeing Heartburn, I rented Silkwood. Also directed by Mike Nichols, whom I consider something of a god, it was Ms Ephron’s most dramatic film. It stars Ms Streep and Cher, in to my mind her best dramatic performance along with Mask and Come Back to the Five and Dime, Jimmy Dean, as employees in a nuclear power plant. I know an EPA lawyer of nearly three decades who avoids films in the “toxic waste” genre like this or Erin Brockovich , which while good, is not in the same league as Silkwood. It is a whistleblower story. And while I recognize that the moral dichotomy between bad industry and good environmentalists is too facile and naive about the role of money in litigation related thereto, I adored the film and was decimated and almost haunted by it for a day or two.
 
I saw When Harry Met Sally in Berkeley, California, during the summer after my junior year in high school. Because I have an elephant brain, I remember the name of the girl–a debater at College Prep, whose Boalt Law-educated debate coach was best friends with my coach at Westlake–in whose house I stayed (Abby Fateman). I was the only girl who qualified for Nationals that year.
 
College Prep was a bigger or at least more focused on national and state tournaments, and sent seven or eight kids to Golden, Colorado. I traveled with King Scholfield and his wife, Terri, and bonded more with those kids (both boys and girls) than I had at Westlake after 10th grade, when many of my friends had graduated. I clicked so well with these debaters socially (fun, cool, good-looking and decidedly not geeky like the LA debaters), I flew to Northern California to spend a week with Abby and her friends. They were all off to college in the fall (Vassar, Swarthmore and other such places) and I remember seeing the film in a nearly packed theater with the audience literally laughing nonstop throughout. I saw the film at least two more times in the theater back in LA and it’s one of about ten films, along with Goodfellas, based upon the book Wiseguys by Mr. Peleggi, Ms Ephron’s third husband.
 
To this day, the simple but profound question at the heart of When Harry Met Sally – can women and men really just be friends? – continues to be asked in films infinitely less insightful and funny. My take is that men and women can be not just friends, but intimate and even best friends without having sex, but it’s rare. And it can only happen with a man of uncommon maturity and self-restraint.
 
Billy Crystal’s character, Harry, is quite right on the drive from the University of Chicago to Manhattan. Chomping on grapes and spitting the seeds out the window, which fairly assaults Sally’s OCD sensibilities (which Ryan told James Lipton on Inside the Actor’s Studio she modeled after a “persnickety” friend of hers), he tells Ryan’s character, Sally, donning her preppy outfit with Farrah Faucet Aqua Net 1970s hair, that men don’t just want to sleep with their attractive female friends; they also want to sleep with their unattractive ones. In his memorable formulation: “You pretty much want to nail them too.”
 
Of course I enjoyed Ms Ephron’s other hits like Sleepless in Seattle, though it is my least favorite Ephron film in her canon. I vastly preferred her underrated directorial debut, This is My Life, about a single Jewish mother of two daughters in Queens, working at a department store cosmetics counter, who lives with her beloved aunt. Carly Simon writes great tearjerker ballads and her music for this film is no different.
 
The 1992 film stars one of my favorite actresses of all time – Julie Kavner – along with Gaby Hoffman and Samantha Mathis as her daughters, long before either one was well-known. Dan Ackroyd plays an agent for stand-up comedians and her eventual love interest and the ensemble is full of talented comedic actors and stand-ups who become the girls’ babysitters when Dottie’s dream of being a standup comedian gradually becomes a reality. Upon her aunt’s abrupt death and Dottie’s discovery that the house is worth quite a lot more than she realized (a spectacular scene in which Kavner is told by her aunt’s lawyer the estate is worth a “little bit more” than expected and she says in her inimitable way, something like, “How much more? A little bit more could mean a lot of things!”), Dottie moves the girls to Manhattan.
 
I’m a sucker for film or TV portrayals of perfect mother/daughter relationships and like the one between Lorelai and Rory Gilmore in Gilmore Girls, one of the most significant TV shows in my life ever, this one comes pretty close. Tensions arise as Dottie’s career takes off and she is on the road more and more. The teen daughter, played by Mathis, is just beginning to discover the world of boys and finally finds one she likes, the smart, sweet though geeky son of two endocrinologists in the city. Her mother’s absence comes at an inconvenient time. Hoffman, the little girl, handles Dottie’s absence better but soon grows weary of her absence. But to my mind, this is all pretty minor stuff and it wasn’t as if Dottie was a stay-at-home mom back in Queens, likely earning minimum wage selling cosmetics.
 
Victorian Ordin as a teenager
The great serious point of the film, emerges after Dottie and Ackroyd’s character (who eats paper napkins at comedy clubs) become a real couple and Mathis performs for her little sister and comedian babysitter, a vicious, parodic impersonation of her mother, unaware Dottie has come home early is behind her the whole time. Mathis shows her dramatic chops here, even as a teenager, and when both girls run to their rooms and slam their doors, Kavner says to Ackroyd, “People say your kids are happy when you’re happy, but it’s not true. Kids are happy when you’re there. You give a kids a choice between mom suicidal in the next room and blissfully happy on the beach in Hawaii, they’ll take suicidal in the next room!”
 
As I wrote yesterday on my Facebook Victorian Chick, I happen strongly to disagree with this premise. I made a mutual decision at 14.5 years old, the summer between eighth and ninth grade, not to live with my parents on their gorgeous CT 54 ketch in Marina Del Rey because beginning in about the seventh grade, my father became increasingly challenging, shall we say. I also didn’t like being in the Marina with no decent mass transit, isolated from all my friends in Brentwood, Westwood, Pacific Palisades and Santa Monica, particularly when Dad was so possessive of Mom’s off-work time and not exactly enthusiastic about the prospect of her schlepping me all over the Westside on “his” weekends. I also believe in the notion of “quality time” and was best friends with my mother minus ten years of complete estrangement.
 
In all that time I was so angry, not once did I begrudge my mother her trailblazing legal career. I didn’t care that I didn’t see her till 7 pm on weekdays, though the year she taught at UCLA Law and came home at 4 pm when I was 10, was fabulous. I was proud of having a powerhouse lawyer for a mother and simply wanted 50% of her time and energy when she wasn’t working. This is not how the percentage was divided between me and my father and on other deeper and sublter psychological levels it was even more skewed than that.
 
Thus, I elected, at an age most people (including as it turns out, a family psychoanalyst upon hearing about this some years later) would consider outrageously early for a girl to live alone on weekends in a house of 2500 square feet 20 or so minutes from her parents’ boat and weekend residence, precisely because I preferred to live in a lovely, peaceful environment without a man I loved dearly but who, according to my Yale freshman roommate, “sucked oxygen out of the room.”
 
However, I was not a normal child. I was never a child really, not after fourth or fifth grade and even then I was quite precocious and more accustomed to the company of adults, lawyers and entertainment industry people at dinner parties or homes I stayed, than I was to children. But my disagreement with what is one of the film’s main contentions is irrelevant and it is Ms Ephron’s rare and profound ability to raise complex and thought-provoking questions about family, friendship and marriage in a warm and comedic context that has made her films (even when they do portray a quite specific demographic, often with a Jewish twist) so accessible and popular over three decades.
 
(Victoria Ordin blogs the 'lit'ry life' from Caifornia).
 

Tuesday, 12 July 2011

The ABC's...



Chaucer's Books, Santa Barbara
Photo: Victoria Ordin/Writers Clearinghouse
 ... Of My Life in Letters

“The effort really to see and really to represent is no idle business in the

face of the constant force that makes for muddlement.”
-- Henry James, Preface to What Maisie Knew


“She had for many hours the sense of showing Mrs. Wix so much that she
was comparatively slow to become conscious of being at the same time the
subject of a like aim. The business went the faster, however, from the moment she
got her glimpse of it; then fell into its place in her general, her habitual
view of the particular phenomenon that, had she felt the need of words for it,
she might have called her personal relation to her knowledge."
-- Henry James, What Maisie Knew (Chapter XXV)

By Victoria Ordin
[Writers Clearinghouse News Service]


Santa Barbara, California
Questions of knowledge and representation have always, at least since adolescence, been at the center of my life. Far earlier than most, I think, my ways of constructing reality were deeply personal and emotional issues. From 7th grade on, I never had any doubt that I wanted to be a college professor of literature.

By senior year in high school, when I studied English at UCLA with some of the best professors in the department —Jack Kolb, David Rodes and Ruth Yeazell (who was to remain in my life for two decades in one form or another) -- having exhausted the courses taught at Westlake School for Girls -- this was more than vague notion.

I remember writing a paper on Congreve's Way of the World (certainly the most famous and arguably the best of the Restoration comedies, though I like Richard Sheridan just as much), and going to the UCLA English Reading room to find criticism. I do not recall the articles I found in the conceptual oasis of Rolfe Hall, as I have lost a great deal of my Yale and UCLA papers. I only remember that as I turned the pages of the two books I found, I felt what I take to be the sort of rapture, clarity, and passion which religious people report when they find God and decide in some fundamental way to structure their lives around their personal relationship to this entity.

The kind of thinking and writing I encountered for the first time in these literary-critical articles was unlike any I had encountered in political science journals like Foreign Affairs or World Policy Journal, both of which I read on a fairly regular basis as a top high school debater and competitor in foreign extemporaneous speaking. I enjoyed those journals, but the analytic-critical writing they contained seemed to me devoid of imagination and truly innovative thought. Literary criticism immediately struck me as a form of art, yet one so unlike fiction, a form of art which I could never envision creating, having neither fictional nor poetic talent, training or aspiration.

So when I moved from New Haven to Santa Barbara in September, 1996, to begin an MA/PhD program in English with the intention of specializing in British literature (though I was not sure if it would be the 18th or the 19th century), walking into Chaucer's Books gave me the illusion that I was not in what I considered by the first or second quarter the waste land of Santa Barbara but rather the cultural and literary mecca of New Haven. (I realize some of my readers on the East Coast will smile at this celebration cum idealization of New Haven, but believe me, compared to Santa Barbara, New Haven is heaven on earth for an intellectual, partly because of Yale and partly because of its proximity to Boston and other Eastern cities like New York, Washington, and Philadelphia.

Only in 1998, when I began to prepare for my MA exam — Restoration and 18th Century Literature, Romantic/Victorian Literature, General Theory were my fields — and came to understand how ill-suited I was for UCSB's English department, with its Cultural Studies focus, did Chaucer's come to be the saving grace of my graduate school years. I do not remember when Amazon and Barnes and Noble became fixtures in the lives of American readers, but I remember buying many books there for the M.A exam, those which I could not check out from Davidson Library or wanted to have in my personal library. Some I bought off the shelves; others I ordered.

Below is a list of books which stand out in my mind as having a more than ordinary influence on me. But I will here discuss just four texts from the list. Three helped shape my critical orientation (roughly, proponent of philosophical/rhetorical criticism rather than Cultural Studies (CS)). One —Charlotte Bronte's last novel and in Tony Tanner's view her most complex — at once shaped my understanding of crucial ethical issues driving Eliot's fiction and deepened my understanding of my own isolation (and early in her life Eliot's as well) in critically productive, not merely psychologically useful, ways.

Rather than strive for comprehensiveness of synopsis with these texts, I discuss them in the Jamesean terms set forth in the quotations with which I began, in terms of their “personal relation [to my] knowledge.” Put another way, each of these texts sharpened my understanding of my relation to my knowledge, made that knowledge in some meaningful William Jamesean sense, “mine.”

Of course, the preoccupations and preferences these texts express shaped and defined my worldview long after the years of graduate school proper. As George Eliot said in Daniel Deronda (1876), her last novel and my favorite after Middlemarch -- as well as the subject of my unfinished fifth dissertation chapter about Eliot's “fictional project” -- the moment of finding an idea is like that of finding a person. So I think of my introduction to these texts as social encounters in the broadest sense:

Literature and the Question of Philosophy, ed. Anthony Casardi, 2). Contingency, Irony, Solidarity, Richard Rorty, 3). Literary Criticism: An Autopsy, Mark Bauerlein, and 4). Villette , Charlotte Bronte.

My first chair of the dissertation, Kay Young, recruited me largely on the strength of a 26-page paper on Emily Dickinson and skepticism, which I wrote for Richard Brodhead's lecture on 19th-century American literature at Yale in 1994. It was a lecture, not a seminar, but I bonded deeply with my wonderful TA, Margo Crawford, later assistant professor at Vassar, and she gave the paper to Brodhead, then Dean of Yale and now Duke President.


The paper relied heavily on a book by Christopher Benfrey, Emily Dickinson and the Problem of Others, and essentially argued that instead of viewing her legendary isolation in terms of an aversion to people, we ought instead to view it in terms of skepticism or the problem of other minds along the lines Benfrey suggested. Kay did her dissertation at Harvard with Stanley Cavell and Phil Fisher.

I now realize that reading a paper by an applicant which revealed a profoundly philosophical approach to literature — rare at UCSB — made an impression. No talk of race, class, gender, or sexuality: simply a rhetorical focus and interest, in what she said to me on a day in her office I will never forget, the category and notion of “the human.” This, she explained to me the second quarter of my first year, was not only no longer trendy in literary studies; it had all but disappeared as a legitimate object of inquiry.


Tears actually came to Kay's eyes when describing her relationship to Cavell — not simply the enormously close personal relationship they shared, as I take it he was like a second father to her, but the intellectual mentoring she was privileged to experience with one of the philosophical legends of our time. (I recently bought Cavell's autobiography, Little Did I Know, at Chaucer's and it's at the top of my reading list at the moment).

For Kay, literary criticism was and remains an avocation. The ethical criticism she practices in the tradition of Martha Nussbaum and Stanley Cavell, among others, stems from a deeply felt place in her. She was one of the three or four professors at UCSB for whom criticism represented an all-encompassing intellectual and emotional endeavor, one reason I related to her on such a profound level. And in fact, relations between thinking and feeling—embodiment—are crucial to her work though not in any defined Kantian-Schillerian, or even

Kay told me, without sugarcoating, that I would find the field in general and this department in particular, somewhat lonely and frustrating. She told me a girl named Valerie, whose project she was chairing, had left UCSB primarily because she had no one to talk to with similar interests, values, and ideological commitments.

The following quarter, in her beautiful home in Westlake Village with her Harvard-educated neurosurgeon husband and toddler, where we had our independent study on Daniel Deronda (with a view toward producing my first article), Kay loaned me her copy of the Cascardi anthology with essays by Anthony Cascardi on Romantic responses to Kant relative to the natural and the sublime, Martha Nussbaum on literature and the moral imagination in Henry James's The Golden Bowl (a now famous, seminal essay reproduced in many places), Dalia Judovitz on relations between poetry and philosophy in Plato and Descartes, and Arthur Danto on general relations between philosophy and literature. The book also features essays by Denis Dutton, Harry Berger and many others in the philosophy/lit orbit.

Literature and the Question of Philosophy, said Kay, was the Bible of the sort of criticism that interested me and was essential to grasping the theoretical foundations of the joining of the two disciplines. I ordered my own copy at the end of the quarter at Chaucer's and it became one of my most used and loved books when it came time to study for the M.A., write my dissertation prospectus, and take my Orals in the spring of 2001.

The second book, which appeared on the 9 or 10 category General Theory list of books for the MA Exam, was Richard Rorty's Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. I fell in love with Rorty upon reading the introduction to the book listed under “pragmatism,”, but obviously encompassing far more than this school of philosophy (hence its inclusion on the General Theory list). After having to wade through the feminism, New Historicism and psychoanalysis on the list (the first two of which I have long since banished from my mind), Rorty was at once a pleasure and relief.

The climate of this department which I felt to be inhospitable on every level is captured by the generally negative and faintly derisive tone with which one of the smartest students in my year-- a unusually attractive Medievalist who came to UCSB with an MA — spoke of Rorty. She said, “Oh I find it very hard-going,” adding that it was not at all appealing to her. Of course Zizek—a thinker invested in Hegelian thought, Lacanian psychoanalysis and Marxism—one of the theorists her adviser, Louise Fradenberg, loved most and unquestionably among the most convoluted (and unpleasant) theorists on the list, struck her as compelling and not that difficult.

On a par with Zizek were Deleuze and Guattari — most famous for Capitalism and Schizophrenia, a two-volume work comprised of Anti-Oedipus (1972) and A Thousand Plateaus (1980). D and G, as they are called for short, discuss a range of psychoanalytic/Lacanian, economic and political concepts, much of them organized around desire. But Zizek's “The Rhizome” was simply awful to me, utterly without interest. Until I looked it up to write this piece, I could not define for you a “rhizome.” Now that I know, I am not at all sorry! It is essentially a complex botanical metaphor for thought with so much jargon of a pseudo-scientific flavor that it makes Paul de Man look transparent. And to what end, from the perspective of literary studies?

On the heels of Zizek or D and G, Rorty was like manna with his talk of “rule-governed sentences,” “conceptual vocabularies” and “the traditional subject-object picture,” to say nothing of his mention of Hilary Putnam, Wilfrid Sellars, and Donald Davidson, famous Analytic philosophers none of whose names ever once arose in the course of a conversation, syllabus or seminar in all of grad school.

A sentence like the following — “Davidson is a nonreductive behaviorist about language in the same way that Ryle was a nonreductive behaviorist about mind” (15)--excited me in a way hard, thirteen years later, to describe. I just didn't care about gender or race or class or sexuality and I certainly didn't care about capitalism—not in an intellectual sense. I so longed to think about mind, consciousness, and language, that the mere reference to these topics in Rorty's initial chapters, particularly in the context of philosophers of mind like Gilbert Ryle and Davidson, stilled the intense discomfort I felt when confronted with issues so far afield from anything I studied at Yale or ever even cared about.

I realized, even before Bauerlein's book, to which I will come shortly, that ignoring capitalism or economics more generally, was precisely the sort of apolitical stance (here, one which denied the reality of capitalist forces) which the political or Marxist-influenced critics regarded as equivalent to collusion — intended or not — with the status quo. (In case you hadn't guessed by now, this would be bad. God forbid a professor of canonical British literature should entrench the elite or the status quo. Never mind you never signed on to change the world, merely to enrich your life and the lives of others with an appreciation of beauty on the deepest philosophical levels through a transmission to young people of one of the greatest literary traditions in history. Had I wanted to save the world I would have gotten a law degree and become a public interest attorney!)

I just couldn't bear the whole ethos of the department, apart from thinking the students were just not nice. Let me say, the human light of USCB for me was Elizabeth Heckendorn Cook, who had come from Yale to UCSB one year before as an associate. She is a feminist critic — but not theorist — and I so enjoyed her seminar on Restoration and 18th century female writers. She's brilliant and extremely wide-ranging and she does not practice as a one-dimensional critic like so many do in all of the cultural studies fields.

But in general, I could not see so much of the theory list had to do with the formal, rhetorical features of the literary objects I thought I was there to study (and I did general theory, not the genders and sexuality list, you can imagine what that list looked like — sheer torture). And of course the answer is that it didn't, which is why Bauerlein's book, though merely a theoretical glossary of terms with a definite axe to grind about the hijacking of traditional literary studies by “political criticism” (one of the twenty or so entries in the books) was so refreshing.

Before turning to Bauerlein, however, let me say that when I picked CIS back up last month, I noticed the dedication for the first time: “In memory of six liberals, my parents and grandparents.” I never thought about politics at Yale or UCSB during both which I was essentially apolitical beyond the act of voting, so this meant nothing to me.

But of course Rorty's advocacy of what he calls the “liberal ironist,” following Judith Shklar's definition of a liberal as “one who think[s] cruelty is the worst thing we do” (xv), drives the multiplicity of topics and arguments he offers throughout the book. Rorty defines “ironist” as “the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of his or her own most central beliefs and desires—and someone sufficiently historicist and nominalist to have abandoned the idea that those central beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance” (xv).

The book is dense and complex but not at all “hard-going” if you have a basic background in philosophy. The chapters which moved me most were those on the contingency of language (Chapter 1), the contingency of selfhood (Chapter 3), and solidarity (Chapter 9). I did not, for the exam, read the Derrida, Orwell, or Nabokov chapters. But a mere listing of chapter topics reveals a main objective of Rorty's: to turn us away from “theory” and “toward narrative” (xvi). Of course, this is a familiar move in the lit and philosophy crowd, much of which argues that literature can explore ethics in a way that traditional moral theory cannot and further, that it is in part the particularity, vividness, and immediacy of narrative which allows literature to do what philosophy cannot.

But for Rorty, the turn to narrative has a particular thrust; he believes that “there is no way to bring self-creation together with justice at the level of theory.” This is because the “vocabulary of self-creation is necessarily private, unshared, unsuited to argument” and the “vocabulary of justice is necessarily public and shared, a medium for argumentative exchange.” The good news, for Rorty, is that writers devoted to the former goal which he also calls “autonomy” and “private perfection,” such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Baudelaire, Proust, Heidegger, and Nabokov, and those devoted to justice such as Marx, Mill, Dewey, Habermas and Rawls, “are in as little need of synthesis as paintbrushes and crowbars.”

Now, while Rorty's work may not have direct impact on the analysis of an individual text (beyond those of Orwell or Nabokov to which Rorty devotes whole chapters), one can see (or I could) that though these complex and abstract philosophical reflections do not necessarily yield insight into this or that text, they deal with ideas about truth, meaning, language, selfhood taken up by two different sorts of writers (autonomy vs. justice writers) and also that basic topics and concerns are fundamentally at stake in the most compelling literary texts.

More important, the study of a Rorty does not threaten or negate what those of us who grew up (in college) with a more traditional, formal approach to literary analysis. I am not saying that a reading of Wordsworth in a survey course at Yale would not be in some way by the work of deconstructive or Yale School critics like Geoffrey Hartman, but never once in my experience, was theory taught at the expense of traditional explication, whatever the genre of the text in question.

Thus, while Bauerlein does not endorse philosophy over other types of theory in the crowded late-20th century conceptual landscape (and in fact takes a potshot at Cascardi's title—objecting to this familiar “X and the question of” critical practice), his general emphasis on the “methodological” over the “representational” implies a preference for the kind of rigor about issues central to literature (like meaning) which philosophy generally possesses to a higher degree than much fast-and-loose, jargon-laden literary criticism.

Bauerlein cleverly defines and illustrates the “representational”/“methodological” distinction in the preface through two hilarious but depressing anecdotes which reveal that the discipline is dead (he merely conducts “the autopsy” without offering much by way of solution): 1). the hiring process of a new professor in his department and 2). an absurd and grandiose conference paper submitted by an inexperienced student with shamefully sloppy argumentation and an apparent lack of any common sense or training in formal explication.

The meaning of “representation” is of course a vast topic. But Bauerlein simply means to underline the damage the “representational” task articulated without definition as “the goal” with the new hire. Who or what is to be represented? The world at large? Particular interests? Or “demographic equivalence?” And to what end? Bauerlein spends much of the book stressing that when “literary study involved research into and teaching of reading and writing skills, literary history, textual interpretation, its methodological parameters and canons of evaluation were understood, if debatable” (xi). Now, it is quite simply a big mess.

The introduction begins with one of the all-time great sentences in a book of this kind: “To many professors of literature and language, overstepping the traditional boundaries of literary criticism seems like a good idea.” Of course all 23 entries — from cultural poetics to cultural studies to discourse to gender to problematize to essentialize — explain why it's not a good idea at all. I particularly like the deconstruction entry (42-8) because he attacks not the early practitioners like Hillis Miller — or Derrida himself — who were steeped in the Continental tradition, but those who “neglect philosophical context” and the “promiscuous” usages which proliferate as a result. The gender entry (62-9) is damning, particularly its citation of a labyrinthine, nonsensical definition put forth by Joan Wallach Scott.

As heartening as the three texts I have thus far discussed were to me at UCSB, I remained extremely lonely socially and intellectually and the last book I will discuss — Villette -- influenced me at the deepest possible level. Tony Tanner, the great Austen critic, calls it one of the great modern studies of “self without society” (a description just as pertinent to Dickinson, a poet whose work always seems to lurk in the background of so much I studied). Lucy Snowe's search for a home, and for a project which will ground her in the world with others — in some “expressive activity” or what Tanner frames as a “project” along the lines of phenomenologists (also Sartre), resonated on a visceral level for me. The novel also explores the boundaries between the sane and the insane, figured partly in terms how the power of objects triumphs over human autonomy (14). Richard Eldridge, my Orals member from Swarthmore, writes a good deal about “intentionality” and added another layer of meaning to me.

The despair Lucy articulates early on in the novel became in some ways the ultimate hope of my dissertation, which I hoped would change my life, save me, and make me “at-home” (a significant issue in Kant's aesthetic theory) by giving me a project and way of being in the world with others as professional literary critic and academic. Eliot's value of sympathy or “fellow-feeling” is quite close to Bronte's, yet another reason this novel meant so much. And monotony and boredom (lack of stimulation) along with profound suffering, were constants in my life as well. Isolation of this magnitude imposes a great burden on the self to contain and record experience in the absence of an other or others.

For years I had hoped I could answer the questions posed in the following passage in the affirmative. I could not, at least not through a career in academia, but I have been able to find a home both intellectually, emotionally, and geographically as well as a “project,” my blogging:


Is there nothing more for me in life — no true home — nothing
to be dearer to me than myself, and by its paramount precious-
to draw from me better things than I care to culture for myself
only? Nothing at whose feet I can willingly lay down the whole
burden of human egotism and gloriously take up the nobler
charge of laboring and living for others?

Informing the text:
1. Richard Rorty: Contingency, Irony, Solidarity, Essays on Heidegger and Others.
2. EBB, Aurora Leigh.
3. Paul de Man: Aesthetic Ideology
4. Wayne Booth: Rhetoric of Fiction. (Not a favorite of mine, but a must read for someone who works on narrative)
5. Tim Hilton: Ruskin: The Early Years
6. Robert Pippin: Idealism as Modernism.
7. Hans Georg Gadamer: Truth and Method.
8. Elizabeth Gaskell: Mary Barton
9. Friedrich Holderlin: Hyperion and Selected Poems, trans/edit Eric Santer
10. GE: Impressions of Theophrastus Such, Daniel Deronda, Middlemarch, Silas Marner
11. Lyotard: Postmodern Condition (MA list, not read by choice).
12. Carol Rovane: The Bounds of Agency, An Essay on Revisionary Metaphysics
13. Charles Taylor: Sources of the Self, Hegel and Modern Society.
14. Thomas Nagel: View from Nowhere
15. Elizabeth Gaskell: Life of Charlotte Bronte.
16. Derrida: Of Grammatology.
17. Essays on Aristotle's Poetics, ed Amelie Rorty.
18. Identities of Persons, ed. Amelie Rorty.
19. John Dewey: Art as Experience.
20. Richard Eldridge: Beyond Representation

New books: Stanley Cavell autobiography; Live Nude Girl: My Life as an Object, Kathleen Rooney; Mary Shelley: The Last Man; Tobias Smollett: Peregrine Pickle.